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Full Idea
The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
Gist of Idea
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed
Source
Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.213
A Reaction
[Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |