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Single Idea 8864

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism ]

Full Idea

It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally.

Gist of Idea

We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer

Source

Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13)

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.218


A Reaction

Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of?


The 12 ideas with the same theme [much of ontology is actually convenient fictions we create]:

Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong]
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes]
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo]
For me, fictions are internally true, without a significant internal or external truth-value [Yablo]
Make-believe can help us to reason about facts and scientific procedures [Yablo]
'The clouds are angry' can only mean '...if one were attributing emotions to clouds' [Yablo]
Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]