more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject.
Gist of Idea
Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements
Source
Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.217
A Reaction
This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'?
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |