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Full Idea
One's beliefs can be comprehensively coherent without amounting to knowledge.
Gist of Idea
Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge
Source
Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.116
A Reaction
Beliefs that are fully foundational or reliably sourced may also fail to be knowledge. I take it that any epistemological theory must be fallibilist (Idea 6898). Rational coherentism will clearly be sensitive to error.
Related Idea
Idea 6898 Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |