more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
There is a difference between having just an indexical concept which one can apply to a perceptual characteristic (just saying 'this is thus'), and having a thicker perceptual concept of that characteristic.
Gist of Idea
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts
Source
Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.2)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.124
A Reaction
Both of these, of course, would precede any categorial concepts that enabled one to identify the characteristic or the object. This is a ladder foundationalists must climb if they are to reach the cellar of basic beliefs.
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |