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Single Idea 8883

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations ]

Full Idea

Are foundationally justified beliefs perhaps those that result from attending to our experience and to features of it or in it?

Gist of Idea

Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience?

Source

Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.3)

Book Ref

Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.128


A Reaction

A promising suggestion. I do think our ideas acquire a different epistmological status once we have given them our full attention, though is that merely full consciousness, or full thoughtful evaluation? The latter I take to be what matters. Cf Idea 2414.

Related Idea

Idea 2414 When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]


The 11 ideas with the same theme [experience is the foundation for knowledge]:

The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume]
All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell]
Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars]
Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M]
Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]