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Full Idea
Some intrinsic features of our thoughts are attributable to them directly, or foundationally, while others are attributable only based on counting or inference.
Gist of Idea
Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred
Source
Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 7.5)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.134
A Reaction
In practice the brain combines the two at a speed which makes the distinction impossible. I'll show you ten dot-patterns: you pick out the sixer. The foundationalist problem is that only those drained of meaning could be foundational.
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |