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Single Idea 8894
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
]
Full Idea
The 3rd standard objection to coherence is the demand for a meta-justification for coherence, a reason for thinking that justification on the basis of the coherentist view of justification is in fact likely to lead to believing the truth.
Gist of Idea
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
Source
Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 3.2)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.54
A Reaction
Some coherentists respond by adopting a coherence theory of truth, which strikes me as extremely unwise. There must be an underlying optimistic view, centred on the principle of sufficient reason, that reality itself is coherent. I like Idea 8618.
Related Idea
Idea 8618
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the coherentist view]:
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23206
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Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme
[Nietzsche]
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21497
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If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments
[Ewing]
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6873
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Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously
[Goldman]
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8879
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Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge
[Sosa]
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8813
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If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress
[Pollock]
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8891
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My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics
[Bonjour]
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8892
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Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input
[Bonjour]
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8894
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Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
[Bonjour]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3589
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Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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2732
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Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
[Audi,R]
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2733
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It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
[Audi,R]
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2734
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A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
[Audi,R]
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6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6367
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
[Pollock/Cruz]
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10340
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Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
[Kusch]
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10345
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Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
[Kusch]
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7297
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My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world
[Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
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21496
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Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely
[Olsson]
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21499
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Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable
[Olsson]
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21502
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A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world
[Olsson]
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21512
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Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable
[Olsson]
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19721
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Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience
[Mittag]
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