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Single Idea 8896

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs ]

Full Idea

If we describe a non-conceptual conscious state, we are aware of its character via the constitutive or 'built-in' awareness of content without need for a conceptual description, and so recognise that a conceptually formulated belief about it is correct.

Gist of Idea

Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct

Source

Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.3)

Book Ref

Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.73

A Reaction

This is Bonjour working very hard to find an account of primitive sense experiences which will enable them to function as 'basic beliefs' for foundations, without being too thin to do anything, or too thick to be basic. I'm not convinced.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:

1670 When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
20795 Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
5004 We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
23245 Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
3580 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
4582 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]