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Single Idea 8897
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
]
Full Idea
The adverbial account of the content of experience is almost certainly correct, because no account can be given of the relation between sense-data and the apprehending mind that is independent of the adverbial theory.
Gist of Idea
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data
Source
Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 5.1 n3)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.78
A Reaction
This boils down to the usual objection to sense-data, which is 'cut out the middle man'. Bonjour is right that at some point the mind has finally to experience whatever is coming in, and it must experience it in a particular way.
The
41 ideas
from Laurence Bonjour
3695
|
Philosophy is a priori if it is anything
[Bonjour]
|
3696
|
A priori justification requires understanding but no experience
[Bonjour]
|
3697
|
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity
[Bonjour]
|
3698
|
Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief
[Bonjour]
|
3699
|
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements
[Bonjour]
|
3701
|
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
[Bonjour]
|
3702
|
Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism
[Bonjour]
|
3700
|
Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence
[Bonjour]
|
3704
|
Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification
[Bonjour]
|
3703
|
You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up
[Bonjour]
|
3651
|
Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning
[Bonjour]
|
3706
|
A priori justification can vary in degree
[Bonjour]
|
3707
|
Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight
[Bonjour]
|
3708
|
All thought represents either properties or indexicals
[Bonjour]
|
3709
|
Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred
[Bonjour]
|
4255
|
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism
[Bonjour]
|
4261
|
The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner
[Bonjour, by PG]
|
4257
|
The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
[Bonjour]
|
4256
|
The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism
[Bonjour]
|
4258
|
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
[Bonjour]
|
4259
|
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
[Bonjour]
|
4260
|
Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria
[Bonjour]
|
21506
|
A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth
[Bonjour]
|
21508
|
Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic
[Bonjour]
|
21509
|
There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems
[Bonjour]
|
21511
|
A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence
[Bonjour]
|
21510
|
The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency
[Bonjour]
|
21503
|
Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience
[Bonjour]
|
21505
|
A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility
[Bonjour]
|
21504
|
The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality
[Bonjour]
|
8887
|
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization
[Bonjour]
|
8888
|
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided
[Bonjour]
|
8889
|
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge
[Bonjour]
|
8890
|
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
[Bonjour]
|
8891
|
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics
[Bonjour]
|
8892
|
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input
[Bonjour]
|
8894
|
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
[Bonjour]
|
8893
|
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs
[Bonjour]
|
8895
|
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
[Bonjour]
|
8896
|
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
[Bonjour]
|
8897
|
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data
[Bonjour]
|