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Full Idea
It is unclear how we manage to refer determinately to abstract entities in a sense in which it is not unclear how we manage to refer determinately to other things.
Gist of Idea
How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things
Source
Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Ex')
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.6
A Reaction
This is where problems of abstraction overlap with problems about reference in language. Can we have a 'baptism' account of each abstraction (even very large numbers)? Will descriptions do it? Do abstractions collapse into particulars when we refer?
| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| 9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| 18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |