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Single Idea 8950

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic ]

Full Idea

Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.

Gist of Idea

Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists

Source

Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)

Book Ref

Fisher,Jennifer: 'On the Philosophy of Logic' [Thomson Wadsworth 2008], p.131


A Reaction

Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [that logical entities have independent existence]:

Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
The idea of an atemporal realm of validity is as implausible as medieval theology [Heidegger]
Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk]
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]