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Single Idea 8957

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

Kripke explicitly allows for the introduction of names through initial reference-fixing via descriptions. Versions of the causal theory of reference that disallow this would have a difficult time explaining how the name 'Neptune' came to refer.

Clarification

Neptune was predicted before it was discovered

Gist of Idea

Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 4.2 n35

Book Ref

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.30

A Reaction

The initial reference to Neptune has to be by description, but you could still give a baptismal account once it is discovered. The direct contact now takes precedence. Suppose another similar planet was found nearby...

The 22 ideas with the same theme [names do no more than pick out an object]:

13789 Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
4944 Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
7762 Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
6410 The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
10449 Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
15159 The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
10823 A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
7089 A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
21653 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]