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Single Idea 8957
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
]
Full Idea
Kripke explicitly allows for the introduction of names through initial reference-fixing via descriptions. Versions of the causal theory of reference that disallow this would have a difficult time explaining how the name 'Neptune' came to refer.
Clarification
Neptune was predicted before it was discovered
Gist of Idea
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Zoltán Gendler Szabó - Nominalism 4.2 n35
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.30
A Reaction
The initial reference to Neptune has to be by description, but you could still give a baptismal account once it is discovered. The direct contact now takes precedence. Suppose another similar planet was found nearby...
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[names do no more than pick out an object]:
13789
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Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing
[Plato]
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4944
|
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation
[Mill, by Kripke]
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7762
|
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object
[Mill, by Lycan]
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4978
|
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
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6410
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The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
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15159
|
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
|
10449
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Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
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10823
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A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
|
7089
|
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
|
21879
|
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
[Derrida]
|
9171
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The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
|
8957
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Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
|
10428
|
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
4959
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A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
|
16982
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A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
|
9041
|
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
|
16405
|
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
|
10456
|
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
|
13399
|
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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7306
|
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
[Miller,A]
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
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18945
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Millians say a name just means its object
[Sawyer]
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