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Single Idea 8964

[filed under theme 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor ]

Full Idea

There are two ways that entities can be multiplied unnecessarily: by multiplying the number of explanatory categories, and by multiplying the number of entities within a category.

Gist of Idea

Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category

Source

J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 4)

Book Ref

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.69


A Reaction

An important distinction. The orthodox view is that it is the excess of categories that is to be avoided (e.g. by nominalists). Possible worlds in metaphysics, and multiple worlds in physics, claim not to violate the first case.


The 27 ideas with the same theme ['Do not multiply entities beyond necessity']:

Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham]
Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
Our greatest pleasure is the economy of reducing chaotic facts to one single fact [James]
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]