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Single Idea 8975
[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
]
Full Idea
Kim's events cannot just be the ordered triple of , since many such triples do not yield events, such as . Kim has to specify that the object actually has that property at that time.
Gist of Idea
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements
Source
report of Jaegwon Kim (Events as property exemplifications [1976]) by Peter Simons - Events 2.1
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.365
A Reaction
Why should they even be in that particular order? This requirement rather messes up Kim's plan for a very streamlined, Ockhamised ontology. Circles have symmetry at all times. Is 'near Trafalgar Square' a property?
The
108 ideas
from Jaegwon Kim
4781
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday')
[Kim, by Psillos]
8396
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation
[Kim, by Tooley]
8429
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation
[Kim]
8428
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals
[Kim]
8430
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories
[Kim]
3536
Supervenient properties must have matching base properties
[Kim]
3535
All observable causes are merely epiphenomena
[Kim]
10369
How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated
[Kim, by Schaffer,J]
8976
If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract
[Simons on Kim]
8975
Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements
[Kim, by Simons]
8974
Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time
[Kim, by Simons]
8977
Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties
[Simons on Kim]
8980
Kim's theory results in too many events
[Simons on Kim]
4779
For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times
[Kim, by Psillos]
14470
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event
[Kim]
13314
Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal
[Kim, by Seneca]
2308
Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
[Kim]
2309
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
[Kim]
2310
Supervenience is linked to dependence
[Kim]
2311
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
[Kim]
2313
Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
[Kim]
2314
Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
[Kim]
2315
Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
[Kim]
2317
Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency
[Kim, by PG]
2318
Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes
[Kim, by PG]
2319
Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
[Kim]
2320
Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
[Kim]
2322
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
[Kim]
2323
Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
[Kim]
2324
Intentionality as function seems possible
[Kim]
2325
It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
[Kim]
2327
Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
[Kim]
2328
The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
[Kim]
2329
Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
[Kim]
1550
Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"?
[Plato on Kim]
2065
Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people
[Plato on Kim]
530
There are two contradictory arguments about everything
[Kim]
8825
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
[Kim]
3359
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
[Kim]
3360
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
[Kim]
3362
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
[Kim]
3363
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
[Kim]
3366
Pain has no reference or content
[Kim]
3365
Intentionality involves both reference and content
[Kim]
3367
Both thought and language have intentionality
[Kim]
3368
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
[Kim]
3369
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
[Kim]
3370
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
[Kim]
3371
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
[Kim]
3372
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
[Kim]
3373
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
[Kim]
3374
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
[Kim]
3375
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
[Kim]
3376
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
[Kim]
3377
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
[Kim]
3379
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
[Kim]
3380
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
[Kim]
3382
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
[Kim]
3383
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
[Kim]
3384
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
[Kim]
3387
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
[Kim]
3386
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
[Kim]
3388
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
[Kim]
3389
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
[Kim]
3391
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate
[Kim, by PG]
3390
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
[Kim]
3392
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
[Kim]
3393
How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
3394
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
[Kim]
3397
Beliefs cause other beliefs
[Kim]
3396
Experiment requires mental causation
[Kim]
3399
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
[Kim]
3401
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
[Kim]
3402
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
[Kim]
3403
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
[Kim]
3406
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds
[Kim, by PG]
3407
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause
[Kim]
3408
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
[Kim]
3409
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
[Kim]
3410
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
[Kim]
3412
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
[Kim]
3411
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
[Kim]
3414
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
[Kim]
3413
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
[Kim]
3416
Content may match several things in the environment
[Kim]
3417
Content depends on other content as well as the facts
[Kim]
3418
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
[Kim]
3419
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
[Kim]
3420
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
[Kim]
3421
Content is best thought of as truth conditions
[Kim]
3422
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
[Kim]
3424
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
[Kim]
3426
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
[Kim]
3427
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
[Kim]
3428
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
[Kim]
3430
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
[Kim]
3431
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
[Kim]
3432
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
[Kim]
3434
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
[Kim]
3433
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
[Kim]
3436
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
[Kim]
3437
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
[Kim]
3438
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
[Kim]
3439
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
[Kim]
3440
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
[Kim]
13745
Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence
[Kim]
13746
Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation
[Kim]
15456
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object
[Kim, by Lewis]