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Single Idea 9001

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity ]

Full Idea

When Kant's arithmetical examples of a priori synthetic judgements were sweepingly disqualified by Frege's reduction of arithmetic to logic, attention moved to the less tendentious and logically prior question 'How is logical certainty possible?'

Gist of Idea

Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?'

Source

Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], I)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.107


A Reaction

A nice summary of the story so far, from someone who should know. This still leaves the question open of whether any synthetic truths can be derived from the logical certainties which are available.


The 9 ideas from 'Carnap and Logical Truth'

If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine]
In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine]
Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine]
Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine]
Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine]
If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine]
Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider]
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine]
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]