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Full Idea
In trying to make sense of the role of convention in a priori knowledge, the very distinction between a priori and empirical begins to waver and dissolve.
Gist of Idea
Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge
Source
Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], VI)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.122
A Reaction
This is the next stage in the argument after Wittgenstein presents the apriori as nothing more than what arises from truth tables. The rationalists react by taking us back to the original 'natural light of reason' view. Then we go round again...
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |