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Single Idea 9006

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals ]

Full Idea

One's hypothesis as to there being universals is at bottom just as arbitrary or pragmatic a matter as one's adoption of a new brand of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping.

Gist of Idea

Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping

Source

Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], x)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ways of Paradox and other essays' [Harvard 1976], p.132


A Reaction

This spells out clearly the strongly pragmatist vein in Quine's thinking.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [denial of the real existence of universals]:

The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
Only individuals exist [Reid]
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]