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Full Idea
The strong thesis (that descriptions are sufficient for reference) is outrageous. It would mean that if Mr X is wrongly introduced to me as Mr Y, then I truly say 'this is Mr Y' if X overwhelmingly satisfies descriptions of Y.
Gist of Idea
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
Source
Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.3
A Reaction
[I omit some qualifying phrases] Evans says that probably no one ever held this view. It seems right. In the case of an electron it would seem that all the descriptions could be the same, except space-time location. Same electron as yesterday?
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |