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Full Idea
Sometimes we use expressions with the overriding intention to conform to the use made of them by some other person or persons. I shall say we use the expression 'deferentially'; examples might be 'viol' or 'minuet'.
Gist of Idea
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
Source
Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'Collected Papers' [OUP 1985], p.21
A Reaction
I presume Evans wasn't very musical. This label sounds useful, if you wish to connect Grice's account of meaning with Putnam's externalist account of concepts, where deference to experts is crucial. Is all linguistic usage deferential?
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |