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Single Idea 9044

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance ]

Full Idea

If Tek is borderline tall, the unclarity does not seem to be epistemic, because no amount of further information about his exact height (or the heights of others) could help us decide whether he is tall.

Gist of Idea

If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question

Source

R Keefe / P Smith (Intro: Theories of Vagueness [1997], §1)

Book Ref

'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.2


A Reaction

One should add also that information about social conventions or conventions about the usage of the word 'tall' will not help either. It seems fairly obvious that God would not know whether Tek is tall, so the epistemic view is certainly counterintuitive.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:

Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]