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Single Idea 9054

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic ]

Full Idea

Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only belong to a representation, of which language is an example.

Gist of Idea

Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language

Source

Bertrand Russell (Vagueness [1923], p.62)

Book Ref

'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.62


A Reaction

Russell was the first to tackle the question of vagueness, and he may have got it right. If we are unable to decide which set an object belongs in (red or orange) that is a problem for our conceptual/linguistic scheme. The object still has a colour!


The 18 ideas with the same theme [vagueness as indecision about word meanings]:

Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine]
'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett]
Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]