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Single Idea 9103
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
]
Full Idea
I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind.
Gist of Idea
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind
Source
William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio)
Book Ref
Ockham,William of: 'Ockham's Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Boehner,P [Hackett 1990], p.41
A Reaction
[A footnote says that William later abandoned this view] I don't see a clear distinction here between having real existence in the mind, and being a thought-object in the mind. Maybe we should say 'merely' a thought-object?
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[denial of the real existence of universals]:
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5869
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The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous
[Aristotle]
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10396
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If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational
[Abelard, by King,P]
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10395
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Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals
[Abelard, by King,P]
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9103
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A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind
[William of Ockham]
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15388
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Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify
[William of Ockham]
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17247
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The only generalities or universals are names or signs
[Hobbes]
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7717
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All things that exist are particulars
[Locke]
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7718
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Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas
[Locke]
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6715
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Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
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6719
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No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
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23650
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Only individuals exist
[Reid]
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9006
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Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
[Quine]
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15402
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There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
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8576
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The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
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8503
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The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
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4232
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Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
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