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Single Idea 9114

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism ]

Full Idea

The existence of an immaterial 'intellective soul' ..cannot be demonstrated; for every reason by which we try to prove it assumes something that is doubtful for a man who follows only his natural reason. Neither can it be proved by experience.

Gist of Idea

There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience

Source

William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], I Q x)

Book Ref

Ockham,William of: 'Ockham's Philosophical Writings', ed/tr. Boehner,P [Hackett 1990], p.142


A Reaction

This is splendid honesty from a medieval monk. How would such a clear thinker have responded to modern brain research? Colin McGinn still maintains William's view, despite modern knowledge. Our ignorance produced conceptual dualism.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [we are incapable of explaining the mind-body link]:

There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke]
We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke]
Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke]
Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein]
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn]
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]