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Single Idea 9131

[filed under theme 2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought ]

Full Idea

If there is an upper bound on the length of understandable sentences, then two understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction.

Gist of Idea

Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction

Source

Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 6.4)

Book Ref

Sorensen,Roy: 'Vagueness and Contradiction' [OUP 2004], p.101


A Reaction

Not a huge paradox about the use of the word 'and', perhaps, but a nice little warning to be clear about what is being claimed before you cheerfully assert a screamingly obvious law of thought, such as conjunction.


The 20 ideas from Roy Sorensen

No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]
Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]