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Single Idea 9136

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis ]

Full Idea

The paradox of analysis says if a conceptual analysis states exactly what the original statement says, then the analysis is trivial; if it says something different from the original, then the analysis is mistaken. All analyses are trivial or false.

Gist of Idea

The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false

Source

Roy Sorensen (Vagueness and Contradiction [2001], 8.5)

Book Ref

Sorensen,Roy: 'Vagueness and Contradiction' [OUP 2004], p.138

A Reaction

[source is G.E. Moore] Good analyses typically give explanations, or necessary and sufficient conditions, or inferential relations. At their most trivial they at least produce a more profound dictionary than your usual lexicographer. Not guilty.

Related Ideas

Idea 17082 Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben]

Idea 17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]

The 20 ideas from 'Vagueness and Contradiction'

9119 No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
9116 Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]
9118 The colour bands of the spectrum arise from our biology; they do not exist in the physics [Sorensen]
9121 Illusions are not a reason for skepticism, but a source of interesting scientific information [Sorensen]
9137 Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen]
9139 If nothing exists, no truthmakers could make 'Nothing exists' true [Sorensen]
9140 Which toothbrush is the truthmaker for 'buy one, get one free'? [Sorensen]
9122 God cannot experience unwanted pain, so God cannot understand human beings [Sorensen]
9125 Denying problems, or being romantically defeated by them, won't make them go away [Sorensen]
9124 We are unable to perceive a nose (on the back of a mask) as concave [Sorensen]
9126 Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
9128 It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
9130 Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
9129 I can buy any litre of water, but not every litre of water [Sorensen]
9131 Two long understandable sentences can have an unintelligible conjunction [Sorensen]
9132 An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
9133 Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
9134 The negation of a meaningful sentence must itself be meaningful [Sorensen]
9135 We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
9136 The paradox of analysis says that any conceptual analysis must be either trivial or false [Sorensen]