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Full Idea
In traditional abstraction, the colour green merely has the intrinsic property of being green, other properties of things being abstracted away. But why should that be regarded as a type? It must be because the property is common to the instances.
Gist of Idea
If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things
Source
Kit Fine (Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence [1998], §5)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.19
A Reaction
A nice question which shows that the much-derided single act of abstraction is not sufficient to arrive at a concept, so that abstraction is a more complex matter (perhaps even a rational one) than simple empiricists believe.
9146 | After abstraction all numbers seem identical, so only 0 and 1 will exist! [Fine,K] |
9148 | I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K] |
9149 | To obtain the number 2 by abstraction, we only want to abstract the distinctness of a pair of objects [Fine,K] |
9150 | We should define abstraction in general, with number abstraction taken as a special case [Fine,K] |
9152 | If green is abstracted from a thing, it is only seen as a type if it is common to many things [Fine,K] |