more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 9158

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori ]

Full Idea

If one took the numbers as primitive, one would not be deriving their existence and character from general principles- thus controverting Frege's view of the nature of an a priori subject.

Gist of Idea

For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive

Source

Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority II

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.26


A Reaction

He seems to be in tune with Leibniz on this. His view begs the obvious question of where the general principles come from. I would have thought that relationships between concepts might be known a priori, without principles being involved.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [nature of knowledge acquired by pure thought]:

The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant]
A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley]
A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant]
One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant]
A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer]
For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege]
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher]
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
It is propositional attitudes which can be a priori, not the propositions themselves [Sorensen]
Attributing apriority to a proposition is attributing a cognitive ability to someone [Sorensen]
'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]