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Single Idea 9160

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason ]

Full Idea

Propositions such as 'People usually tell the truth' seem to count as default reasonable, but it is odd to count them as a priori. Empirical indefeasibility seems the obvious way to distinguish those default reasonable propositions that are a priori.

Clarification

'Indefeasible' means there are no counterexamples

Gist of Idea

Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible

Source

Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 1)

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.120


A Reaction

Sounds reasonable, but it would mean that all the uniformities of nature would then count as a priori. 'Every physical object exerts gravity' probably has no counterexamples, but doesn't seem a priori (even if it is necessary). See Idea 9164.

Related Idea

Idea 9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]


The 7 ideas with the same theme [a priori knowledge as the produce of pure reason]:

To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant]
In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher]
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]