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Full Idea
It is not out of the question to hold that without circular justifications there is no reasonableness at all. That is the view of a certain kind of coherence theorist.
Gist of Idea
Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
Source
Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 2)
Book Ref
'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.122
A Reaction
This nicely captures a gut feeling I have had for a long time. Being now thoroughly converted to coherentism, I am drawn to the idea - like a moth to a flame. But how do we distinguish cuddly circularity from its cruel and vicious cousin?
| 3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |