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Single Idea 9162
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
]
Full Idea
Reliability is not all we want in an inductive rule. Completely reliable methods are available, such as believing nothing, or only believing logical truths. But we don't value them, but value less reliable methods with other characteristics.
Gist of Idea
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
Source
Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 3)
Book Ref
'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.125
A Reaction
I would take this excellent point to be an advertisement for inference to the best explanation, which requires not only reliable inputs of information, but also a presiding rational judge to assess the mass of evidence.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[objections to reliabilist justification]:
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22326
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Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate
[Russell]
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4259
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External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
[Bonjour]
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2866
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A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion
[Blackburn]
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8890
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If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
[Bonjour]
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3565
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Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
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2737
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'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
[Audi,R]
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9162
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Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
[Field,H]
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20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
[Zagzebski]
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19522
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More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable
[Conee]
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19521
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If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them
[Conee]
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19523
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Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases
[Conee]
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22327
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Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process
[Potter]
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19725
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In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified?
[Comesaņa]
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19726
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How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable?
[Comesaņa]
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19570
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Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe
[Kvanvig]
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