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Full Idea
I argue not that our most basic rules are a priori or empirically indefeasible, but that we treat them as empirically defeasible and indeed a priori; we don't regard anything as evidence against them.
Gist of Idea
We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
Source
Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 4)
Book Ref
'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.136
A Reaction
This is the fictionalist view of a priori knowledge (and of most other things, such as mathematics). I can't agree. Most people treat heaps of a posteriori truths (like the sun rising) as a priori. 'Mass involves energy' is indefeasible a posteriori.
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |