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Single Idea 9166

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism ]

Full Idea

We should concede that different people have slightly different basic epistemological standards. ..I doubt that any clear sense could be given to the notion of 'correctness' here.

Gist of Idea

People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'

Source

Hartry Field (Apriority as an Evaluative Notion [2000], 5)

Book Ref

'New Essays on the A Priori', ed/tr. Boghossian,P /Peacocke,C [OUP 2000], p.140


A Reaction

I think this is dead right. There is a real relativism about knowledge, which exists at the level of justification, rather than of truth. The scientific revolution just consisted of making the standards tougher, and that seems to have been a good idea.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [defence of context as vital to knowledge claims]:

Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch]
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S]
The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S]