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Single Idea 9168
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
]
Full Idea
My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess). ..We still say that the extension of 'elm' in my idiolect is the same as the extension of 'elm' in anyone else's, viz. the set of all elm trees.
Clarification
An 'idiolect' is an individual's personal version of their language
Gist of Idea
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else
Source
Hilary Putnam (Meaning and Reference [1973], p.154)
Book Ref
'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.154
A Reaction
This example is clearer and less open to hair-splitting than his water/XYZ example. You could, with Putnam, say that his meaning of 'elm' is outside his head, but you could also say that he doesn't understand the word very well.
The
39 ideas
with the same theme
[meanings aren't in the head ('Externalism')]:
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12995
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The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know
[Leibniz]
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12807
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The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances
[Leibniz]
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7531
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We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert
[Russell]
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7055
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Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein
[Wittgenstein, by Heil]
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4138
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Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?
[Wittgenstein]
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9168
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I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else
[Putnam]
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5820
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'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here
[Putnam]
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7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
[Putnam]
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8872
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It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
[Davidson]
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8874
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It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
[Davidson]
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6175
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External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn
[Davidson, by Rowlands]
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3974
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Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
[Davidson]
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3464
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There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
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3416
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Content may match several things in the environment
[Kim]
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3418
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'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
[Kim]
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3421
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Content is best thought of as truth conditions
[Kim]
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16428
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Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
[Stalnaker]
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16474
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How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
[Stalnaker]
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3998
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If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
[Lewis]
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3997
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Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
[Lewis]
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3999
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A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
[Lewis]
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4000
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Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
[Lewis]
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2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
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3982
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How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties?
[Fodor]
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7884
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Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
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7863
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If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
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8248
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Phenomenology says thought is part of the world
[Deleuze/Guattari]
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3207
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Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
[Rey]
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4067
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Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
[Crane]
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7058
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Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
[Heil]
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4922
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Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions
[Edelman/Tononi]
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3758
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Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
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3103
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Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
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3109
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If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
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3116
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Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
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3117
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Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
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19300
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The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means
[Hale]
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