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Full Idea
A statement can be (metaphysically) necessary and epistemologically contingent. Human intuition has no privileged access to metaphysical necessity.
Gist of Idea
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent
Source
Hilary Putnam (Meaning and Reference [1973], p.160)
Book Ref
'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.160
A Reaction
The terminology here is dangerously confusing. 'Contingent' is a term which (as Kripke insists) refers to reality, not to our epistemological abilities. The locution of adding the phrase "for all I know" seems to handle the problem better.
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |