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Single Idea 9171

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

The function of names is simply to refer.

Gist of Idea

The function of names is simply to refer

Source

Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.167)

Book Ref

'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.167


A Reaction

This is Kripke reverting to the John Stuart Mill view of names. If I say "you are a right Casanova" I don't simply refer to Casanova. In notorious examples like 'Homer' reference is fine, but the object of reference is a bit elusive.


The 8 ideas from 'Identity and Necessity'

A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]