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Single Idea 9173
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
]
Full Idea
It seems that we cannot say "Nixon might have been a different man from the man he in fact was", unless we mean it metaphorically. He might have been a different sort of person.
Gist of Idea
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.176)
Book Ref
'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.176
A Reaction
The problem is that being a 'different sort of person' could become more and more drastic, till Nixon is unrecognisable. I don't see how I can stipulate that a small and dim mouse is Richard Nixon, even in a possible world with magicians.
The
137 ideas
from Saul A. Kripke
10163
|
Propositional modal logic has been proved to be complete
[Kripke, by Feferman/Feferman]
|
10760
|
With possible worlds, S4 and S5 are sound and complete, but S1-S3 are not even sound
[Kripke, by Rossberg]
|
16189
|
The variable domain approach to quantified modal logic invalidates the Barcan Formula
[Kripke, by Simchen]
|
15132
|
The Barcan formulas fail in models with varying domains
[Kripke, by Williamson]
|
9172
|
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
9171
|
The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
|
9173
|
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was
[Kripke]
|
9174
|
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori
[Kripke]
|
9175
|
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid
[Kripke]
|
9176
|
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
[Kripke]
|
9177
|
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
[Kripke]
|
9178
|
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property
[Kripke]
|
7430
|
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't
[Armstrong on Kripke]
|
7867
|
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain
[Kripke, by Papineau]
|
3228
|
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful
[Kripke, by Rey]
|
17874
|
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming
[Almog on Kripke]
|
16394
|
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences
[Stalnaker on Kripke]
|
5822
|
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information
[Evans on Kripke]
|
4689
|
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker
[Kripke, by McGinn]
|
17504
|
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
6765
|
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind
[Kripke, by Bird]
|
8957
|
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
|
10428
|
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
10437
|
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
10559
|
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds
[Kripke, by Zalta]
|
16395
|
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent
[Kripke, by Stalnaker]
|
5821
|
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical'
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
14068
|
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay
[Gibbard on Kripke]
|
10436
|
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
8259
|
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction
[Kripke, by Lowe]
|
13975
|
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity)
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
13967
|
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible
[Soames on Kripke]
|
13970
|
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
2408
|
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori
[Kripke, by Chalmers]
|
7761
|
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N'
[Kripke, by Lycan]
|
7693
|
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery
[Kripke, by Jacquette]
|
17647
|
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism)
[Kripke, by Putnam]
|
14896
|
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology
[Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
|
5450
|
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind
[Kripke, by Mautner]
|
16955
|
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
11867
|
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference?
[Kripke, by Wiggins]
|
12018
|
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so
[Kripke, by Forbes,G]
|
13971
|
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential
[Kripke, by Soames]
|
12100
|
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material
[Kripke, by Witt]
|
4797
|
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke
[Kripke, by Psillos]
|
4728
|
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples
[Kripke, by O'Grady]
|
11880
|
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary
[Kripke, by Mackie,P]
|
16991
|
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time
[Kripke]
|
16990
|
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality?
[Kripke]
|
9386
|
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori
[Kripke]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
16997
|
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed
[Kripke]
|
16995
|
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table?
[Kripke]
|
16992
|
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe
[Kripke]
|
16993
|
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon
[Kripke]
|
16998
|
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something
[Kripke]
|
17001
|
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties
[Kripke]
|
4952
|
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones
[Kripke]
|
16986
|
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns
[Kripke]
|
16989
|
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence
[Kripke]
|
4947
|
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be
[Kripke]
|
4953
|
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world
[Kripke]
|
4949
|
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
4951
|
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular
[Kripke]
|
4955
|
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning
[Kripke]
|
16988
|
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence
[Kripke, by PG]
|
4948
|
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
[Kripke]
|
4958
|
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent
[Kripke]
|
17035
|
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent
[Kripke]
|
17033
|
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to
[Kripke]
|
17029
|
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him
[Kripke]
|
17031
|
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions
[Kripke]
|
17034
|
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
[Kripke]
|
17037
|
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree
[Kripke]
|
17030
|
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it
[Kripke]
|
17036
|
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions
[Kripke]
|
17038
|
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different
[Kripke]
|
17047
|
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table
[Kripke]
|
17055
|
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know
[Kripke]
|
17045
|
De re modality is an object having essential properties
[Kripke]
|
17046
|
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents?
[Kripke]
|
4961
|
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents
[Kripke]
|
17048
|
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical
[Kripke]
|
4960
|
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori
[Kripke]
|
4966
|
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori
[Kripke]
|
17056
|
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names
[Kripke]
|
4963
|
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary
[Kripke]
|
17053
|
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold?
[Kripke]
|
4964
|
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth
[Kripke]
|
4959
|
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
|
4967
|
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain
[Kripke]
|
4965
|
Science searches basic structures in search of essences
[Kripke]
|
9387
|
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth
[Kripke]
|
17054
|
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths
[Kripke]
|
17057
|
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
17050
|
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them
[Kripke]
|
17051
|
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances
[Kripke]
|
17049
|
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough
[Kripke]
|
5832
|
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical
[Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
|
4968
|
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong
[Kripke]
|
8274
|
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin'
[Lowe on Kripke]
|
14893
|
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent?
[Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
|
17059
|
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn
[Kripke]
|
17058
|
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary
[Kripke]
|
4970
|
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity
[Kripke]
|
9221
|
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
[Kripke, by Sider]
|
4950
|
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
[Kripke]
|
16999
|
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts'
[Kripke]
|
17000
|
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things
[Kripke]
|
17003
|
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation
[Kripke]
|
4956
|
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object
[Kripke]
|
17032
|
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel'
[Kripke]
|
17044
|
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
[Kripke]
|
11868
|
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity
[Wiggins on Kripke]
|
17052
|
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent
[Kripke]
|
4969
|
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing
[Kripke]
|
16981
|
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation
[Kripke]
|
4942
|
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction
[Kripke]
|
16982
|
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
|
9385
|
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth
[Kripke]
|
4943
|
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.."
[Kripke]
|
16983
|
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things
[Kripke]
|
16984
|
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
[Kripke]
|
16985
|
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic
[Kripke]
|
15327
|
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
16328
|
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications
[Kripke, by Halbach]
|
15343
|
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models)
[Kripke, by Horsten]
|
14967
|
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates
[Kripke, by Gupta]
|
14966
|
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories
[Kripke, by Gupta]
|
16383
|
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object
[Recanati on Kripke]
|
10792
|
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation
[Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
|
7305
|
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air'
[Kripke, by Miller,A]
|
11075
|
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument
[Kripke, by Hanna]
|
11076
|
Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics
[Kripke, by Hanna]
|
19270
|
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish
[Kripke]
|
19269
|
'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5
[Kripke]
|
19271
|
No rule can be fully explained
[Kripke]
|