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Full Idea
The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states.
Gist of Idea
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190)
Book Ref
'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.190
A Reaction
The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't.
| 12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |