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Full Idea
The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states.
Gist of Idea
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190)
Book Ref
'Meaning and Reference', ed/tr. Moore,A.W. [OUP 1993], p.190
A Reaction
The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't.
| 9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
| 9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
| 9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
| 9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| 9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
| 9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
| 9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |