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Single Idea 9184
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
]
Full Idea
We have no prior reason to suppose that philosophically significant concepts have interesting analyses into necessary and sufficient conditions.
Gist of Idea
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed
Source
Timothy Williamson (Review of Bob Hale's 'Abstract Objects' [1988])
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.487
A Reaction
We might think that they are either analysable or primitive, and that failure of analysis invites us to take a concept as primitive. But maybe God can analyse it and we can't.
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[analysis concentrating on contents and source of concepts]:
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23682
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It would be absurd to be precise about the small things, but only vague about the big things
[Plato]
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2187
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If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
[Hume]
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9350
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Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
[Kant]
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18259
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Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
[Kant]
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5530
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Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
[Kant]
|
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23188
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Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts
[Nietzsche]
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8415
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Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object
[Frege]
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7132
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Philosophers should create and fight for their concepts, not just clean and clarify them
[Nietzsche]
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10838
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To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage
[Dummett]
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8559
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Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
[Shoemaker]
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17034
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Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail
[Kripke]
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6980
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Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
[Jackson]
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6983
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Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
[Jackson]
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14707
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Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
[Jackson, by Schroeter]
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15212
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Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know
[Harré/Madden]
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2946
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You cannot demand an analysis of a concept without knowing the purpose of the analysis
[Lehrer]
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11832
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We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
[Wiggins]
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8605
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In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
[Lewis]
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2474
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It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
[Fodor]
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13395
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If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
[Jubien]
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23728
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Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept
[Smith,M]
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11159
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My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis
[Fine,K]
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9184
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We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed
[Williamson]
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14986
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Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones
[Sider]
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14899
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Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?
[Ladyman/Ross]
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17729
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Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses
[Jenkins]
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23770
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Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set
[Williams,NE]
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19259
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If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis
[Vaidya]
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