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Single Idea 9190

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts ]

Full Idea

In later Frege, a concept could be taken as a particular case of a function, mapping every object on to one of the truth-values (T or F), according as to whether, as we should ordinarily say, that object fell under the concept or not.

Gist of Idea

A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5

Book Ref

'Philosophy 2: further through the subject', ed/tr. Grayling,A.C. [OUP 1998], p.147

A Reaction

As so often in these attempts at explanation, this sounds circular. You can't decide whether an object truly falls under a concept, if you haven't already got the concept. His troubles all arise (I say) because he scorns abstractionist accounts.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:

9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
13878 Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
7736 A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
17430 Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
8622 Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19168 Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
13475 The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]