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Full Idea
Quine's logical argument against modality presupposes a naïve view of singular terms under which no significant distinction is to be drawn between the use of names and descriptions.
Gist of Idea
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions
Source
comment on Willard Quine (Two Dogmas of Empiricism [1953]) by Kit Fine - Intro to 'Modality and Tense' p. 6
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.6
A Reaction
See Idea 9201 for Quine's argument. The question is whether '9' and 'the number of planets' are names or descriptions. The 'number of planets' is not remotely descriptive of 9, so it must be referential. So '9' is a name? Hm.
Related Idea
Idea 9201 Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K]
| 7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |