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Full Idea
The failure to distinguish between the identity or essence of an object and its necessary features is an instance of what we may call 'modal mania'.
Gist of Idea
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features
Source
Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p. 9)
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.9
A Reaction
He blames Kripke's work for modal mania, a reaction to Quine's 'contempt' for modal notions. I don't actually understand Fine's remark (yet), but it strikes me as incredibly important! Explanations by email, please.
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
| 9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
| 9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
| 9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
| 9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
| 9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
| 9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
| 9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |