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Single Idea 9209
[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
]
Full Idea
There are two fundamental ways in which a property may be metaphysically necessary: it may be a worldly necessity, true whatever the circumstances; or it may be a transcendent necessity, true regardless of the circumstances.
Gist of Idea
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances'
Source
Kit Fine (Intro to 'Modality and Tense' [2005], p.10)
Book Ref
Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.10
A Reaction
[See Fine's 'Necessity and Non-Existence' for further details] The distinction seems to be that the first sort needs some circumstances (e.g. a physical world?), whereas the second sort doesn't (logical relations?). He also applies it to existence.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[inescapable necessity as a feature of reality]:
444
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The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence
[Parmenides]
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12668
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Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true
[Ellis]
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15099
|
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility
[Shoemaker]
|
15162
|
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life
[Soames]
|
15161
|
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths
[Soames]
|
14677
|
Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever
[Salmon,N]
|
14679
|
Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted
[Salmon,N]
|
14685
|
Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted
[Salmon,N]
|
14690
|
In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there
[Salmon,N]
|
14688
|
Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic
[Salmon,N]
|
16424
|
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
[Chalmers]
|
16425
|
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
[Chalmers]
|
9209
|
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances'
[Fine,K]
|
12207
|
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature
[Edgington]
|
16063
|
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed'
[Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
|
16531
|
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity
[Lowe]
|
3105
|
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
|
15082
|
Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood
[Hale]
|
13707
|
Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible
[Sider]
|
18849
|
Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant
[Rosen]
|
18850
|
'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting
[Rosen]
|
18858
|
Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another
[Rosen]
|
18857
|
Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds
[Rosen]
|
18856
|
Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things
[Rosen]
|
14094
|
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined
[Rosen]
|
16277
|
Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible
[Maudlin]
|
11086
|
Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)
[Hanna]
|
18816
|
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things
[Rumfitt]
|
17959
|
Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued
[Vetter]
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