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Single Idea 9215

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa.

Gist of Idea

Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa

Source

Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6)

Book Ref

Fine,Kit: 'Modality and Tense' [OUP 2005], p.259

A Reaction

I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings.

The 37 ideas with the same theme [basics of essence as foundation of the laws]:

14049 We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus]
12118 Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
12550 If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke]
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
11856 Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz]
12994 Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz]
12808 Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz]
8931 The movement of pure essences constitutes the nature of scientific method [Hegel]
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
12307 Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
5459 Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis]
5461 The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis]
13566 A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
13579 What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
13581 Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
13594 The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
15951 Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P]
12085 Reality is directional [Witt]
11959 Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
9448 Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
11930 One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
9215 Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K]
10411 Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
12239 The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
15702 Essentialism doesn't mean we know the essences [Gelman]
15705 Essentialism encourages us to think about the world scientifically [Gelman]
17479 The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
17485 Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
17484 Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
17396 The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri]
16760 Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
16976 Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]