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Single Idea 9221
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
]
Full Idea
The most famous objection to counterparts is Kripke's objection that Hubert Humphrey wouldn't care if he thought that his counterpart might have won the 1972 election. He wishes that he had won it.
Gist of Idea
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 12) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.10
Book Ref
'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.198
A Reaction
Like Sider, I find this unconvincing. If there is a world in which I don't exist, but my very close counterpart does (say exactly me, but with a finger missing), I am likely to care more about such a person than about complete strangers.
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[there are only closely resembling possible entities]:
13080
|
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals
[Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
|
9176
|
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics
[Kripke]
|
9221
|
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins
[Kripke, by Sider]
|
11986
|
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates
[Plantinga]
|
11987
|
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently
[Plantinga]
|
11973
|
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several
[Kaplan]
|
11972
|
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties
[Kaplan]
|
16409
|
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
[Stalnaker]
|
16411
|
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
[Stalnaker]
|
16412
|
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
[Stalnaker]
|
16454
|
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16994
|
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart
[Kripke on Lewis]
|
11974
|
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
[Lewis]
|
11975
|
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
[Lewis]
|
11977
|
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
[Lewis]
|
14404
|
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
5441
|
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me?
[Mautner on Lewis]
|
5440
|
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else
[Lewis, by Mautner]
|
16291
|
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
[Lewis]
|
17579
|
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
[Inwagen]
|
11110
|
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
[Jubien]
|
12004
|
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
[Forbes,G]
|
13726
|
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them
[Fitting/Mendelsohn]
|
14763
|
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts
[Sider]
|
16239
|
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept
[Hawley]
|
11000
|
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts
[Read]
|
6133
|
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
[Merricks]
|
14402
|
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker
[Merricks]
|
11890
|
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
[Mackie,P]
|
11892
|
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
[Mackie,P]
|
11893
|
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
[Mackie,P]
|