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Single Idea 9221

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

The most famous objection to counterparts is Kripke's objection that Hubert Humphrey wouldn't care if he thought that his counterpart might have won the 1972 election. He wishes that he had won it.

Gist of Idea

The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity notes and addenda [1972], note 12) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.10

Book Ref

'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics', ed/tr. Loux,M /Zimmerman,D [OUP 2005], p.198

A Reaction

Like Sider, I find this unconvincing. If there is a world in which I don't exist, but my very close counterpart does (say exactly me, but with a finger missing), I am likely to care more about such a person than about complete strangers.

The 14 ideas from 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]