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Single Idea 9256

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism ]

Full Idea

How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt.

Gist of Idea

I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do

Source

H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])

Book Ref

Prichard,H.A.: 'Moral Writings' [OUP 2002], p.5


A Reaction

This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [there are no rules, so we must attend to details]:

It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche]
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]