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Full Idea
If the badness of pain were the reason why we ought not to inflict pain on another, it would equally be a reason why we ought not to inflict pain on ourselves; yet, though we would call such behaviour foolish, we wouldn't think it wrong.
Gist of Idea
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves
Source
H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912], n4)
Book Ref
Prichard,H.A.: 'Moral Writings' [OUP 2002], p.10
A Reaction
A very nice point. Note that it will equally well apply to 'benefit' or 'preferences', or any other ideal which utilitarians set out to maximise. It may not be bad to hurt yourself, but it might still be bad to harm yourself.
| 9256 | I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard] |
| 9257 | The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard] |
| 9254 | In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard] |
| 9255 | Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard] |
| 9261 | The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard] |
| 9262 | The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard] |
| 9260 | Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard] |
| 9259 | We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard] |
| 9258 | If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard] |